Everyone in consumer wellness will tell you that a US product launch in India needs eighteen to twenty-four months, a bloated media budget, and a small army. This one didn’t.
In April 2024, Tuhin Jain, who I had worked with once before, brought me into Aspeya (previously called Vectura Fertin Pharma) to set up the digital ecosystem and orchestrate the brand and product launch in India for Neuro, their US nootropic gum.
A clean remit.
A single product.
A new market.
Straightforward, or so I assumed!
It took me a few months to figure out that I was playing a much larger game than the one on the brief.
The money I had wasn’t really a full launch budget. It was closer to a seed-level bet. And the product wasn’t really the point. The product was the instrument. What Aspeya was actually testing was whether the consumer wellness category itself could work in India, for Neuro and for other wellness brands they might bring in after. I wasn’t running a product launch. I was running a category diagnostic for a global consumer wellness company deciding how much of its future to bet on India.
Nobody framed it that way at the start. In hindsight, that was probably the best thing that could have happened, because I designed around discipline and learning rather than scale and spectacle.
What we were actually up against
It’s worth being plain about what Neuro is in the US, because it changes how you read everything that follows.
Neuro is not a small product. It’s a cultural phenomenon. The brand is the only company in Shark Tank history to return after rejecting a deal and secure investment on a second appearance. It was the number one product on TikTok Shop in 2025. It has crossed a hundred million pieces sold across more than ten thousand retail stores including Walmart, Target, CVS, and Whole Foods. Joe Rogan has mentioned it more than thirty times across his podcast! Kim Kardashian has mentioned it. Katy Perry has mentioned it. Steve Aoki came on first as an investor and then as a brand ambassador, with a co-created limited edition flavour. There is a real category around it in the US, a community around it, and a cultural conversation around it.
In India in early 2024, none of that existed in any meaningful way.
Nootropics wasn’t a category you could lean on. The term wasn’t recognised at the search volumes that matter for a launch, not by consumers, and honestly not even by the largest ecomm platforms as a catagory in the way you’d need them to correctly set up a product listing or to run a credible keyword-led strategy!
You can’t SEO your way into a category that isn’t showing up in the data yet. You can’t run keyword campaigns against search volume that isn’t there. You have to build the category around the product at the same time as you’re selling the product, and you have to do that without the budgets of a brand that already owns the category somewhere else.
That is a very different job from “launch a popular American product in India.” The entry was high-risk. And it’s a job that keyword planners and media templates simply cannot do.
What I owned, and what I didn’t
The digital intelligence of the launch sat with me, end to end.
- I built the strategy across our own D2C website, third-party ecomm marketplaces, and social, treating them not as three separate channels but as one connected system that had to compound on itself.
- I led partner selection for D2C and performance, and I built the audience profiling and persona work that the channel mix sat on top of.
- I directed creative for assets that had to work across media, the D2C site and the ecomm listings without reshoots (most even made using CGI product 3D rather than commissioning a full product shoot!).
- I set up ecomm, planned warehousing and inventory, and set the KPIs that the agencies were then held to down to even purchasing the right domain name!
- I owned the feedback loop back into operations for forecasting. Who to target, how, in which markets, and where our first sale would come from, all of it designed as one system rather than five handoffs.
I had trusted partners and agencies running creative execution and social media alongside me, and I’m genuinely grateful they did. None of this was a solo act on the execution side!
The thesis: digital marketing isn’t a job, it’s a science
I didn’t come into Neuro green. At Tata Consumer Products, leading digital for an FMCG portfolio, I learned how category, pricing, distribution and digital actually work as one system, and how to make a media plan accountable to a P&L instead of to a deck. At Royal Enfield, leading social and content strategy, I learned how to build community and content for a brand with deep cultural equity, where the audience is the brand and you can’t fake your way past them.
I brought all of that together for Neuro.
And this is what crossing categories teaches you, and what I think too many founders and CMOs still miss.
The method of digital marketing is category-agnostic. The application changes but the science doesn’t. Persona sharpening, ritual-cuing, trust architecture, funnel sequencing, creative systems, first-party data design, these are transferable principles.
What changes between FMCG and consumer wellness is the regulatory overlay, the claims you can make, and the consumer’s default posture toward the category. Everything else is the same physics.
That single reframe is what let me walk into a wellness launch with cross-category instincts and not waste three months relearning how humans behave online.
Four things the industry keeps getting wrong about launches:
First, they over-invest in awareness before they’ve earned the right to it.
I didn’t buy reach in the traditional launch-campaign sense. I went where intent already existed, at the edges of adjacent categories and competing brands. Productivity and energy buyers converted meaningfully better than broader lifestyle segments, even though the latter was a shinier target. Sales first. Awareness as a by-product.
Second, they treat creative as disposable.
One creative system, directed to work across launch comms, product education, performance media, social and CRM, without reshooting assets for every channel. When you can’t afford to waste money, campaigns give way to systems. A line like “Unlock Your Ritual” had to earn its keep on a reel, on a PDP, in a CRM email and in an influencer brief. If it couldn’t, it didn’t ship.
Third, they sequence the funnel wrong.
Most brands plug CRM in after the sale. We mapped the exact moment it would kick in, late enough not to feel intrusive, early enough not to lose the customer. PII capture, D2C education on a deliberately lean website, aggressive ecomm capture and retention were built as one loop rather than four departments handing off to each other. CRM ended up becoming the single most efficient channel in the mix by a wide margin, not because we spent more on it, but because we designed for it from day one.
Fourth, they confuse “digital marketing” with “running ads.”
The real work was ground up. How we’d land our first presence. How we’d collect first-party data without bribing for it. What would drive sales versus what would drive education. How we’d find new audiences without paying twice to discover them.
What the consumer actually taught us:
The data surfaced patterns no upfront deck could have predicted. The trust deficit in supplements is real, and the consumer, in India and frankly anywhere else, passes a new wellness product through what we started calling “the Google test” before trying it. That meant we had to populate the digital universe with discoverable, searchable content they could self-validate against.
Mobile-first was an understatement, with nearly all orders coming from mobile and heavily skewed toward iOS users. Peppermint gum buyers turned out to be the gateway SKU, later expanding into other flavours and formats, which changed how we thought about bundling and repeat journeys. Weekday mornings between 7 and 11 AM were the peak purchase window, not weekends.
These aren’t things you find out by guessing. You find them out by designing the launch to find them out. That’s the science.
The part I haven’t said out loud until now
This isn’t a hard job. It’s a trust problem.
Launches get expensive and slow when companies hedge. When they split the strategy across five agencies, second-guess the operator, and optimise for the comfort of the review deck instead of the outcome. When one person with the full stack in their head, strategy, media, creative, CRM, commerce and operations, is trusted to run it as one thing rather than five, the math changes.
On the person who made this possible
Tuhin Jain, who then ran new business expansion for Asia at Aspeya, is an ex-founder himself. He came into this with a founder’s instinct for the India opportunity and, just as importantly, a founder’s agenda to prove the market was worth the company’s belief. That combination is rarer than it sounds. Most corporate sponsors running a market-entry project are hedging, waiting for data to make the case for them. He wasn’t. He had the hunch going in and was looking for the right operator, the right agency and the right partners to deliver against it. I think a lot of what got built in this launch exists because he knew exactly what he was trying to prove, and he was willing to back the people who could help him prove it.
This wasn’t the first time Tuhin and I had worked together. A few years earlier, while I was the digital marketing lead at his startup, one of the leading early-stage consumer brands in India at the time and an early entrant into the country’s discovery of speciality coffee and Nespresso format home brewers when that format was still very nascent, he and I built something from the ground up. That chapter was where I really learned ecommerce. Looking back, that earlier run is probably why he came looking for me again. And looking back is also when I realised how intelligent that call was, both his to bring me back, and mine to say yes! :)
What I am most grateful for is the faith. Tuhin gave me the kind of rope most operators never get. Key decisions, I got to drive on his behalf.
He understood, sometimes before I did, that the patience this kind of work demands is not the same as the patience a running business demands. Building a category from zero is slower than selling into an existing one. It asks you to hold your nerve when the dashboards look quieter than you’d like. He held his, and let me hold mine.
I will also say honestly that I found myself educating him and the wider network again and again. That tested my patience more than once. But looking back, that was the generous part. He was learning in public alongside me, and he kept backing the call even when the ground was still shifting. Most sponsors won’t do that. The good ones do. The rare ones understand that when you’re launching into a category that doesn’t exist, the operator is doing two jobs at once and needs air cover for both.
In retrospect
After I delivered the project, I moved on to other ventures. The foundational work continues to compound to date. The system was built to keep going whether I stayed or not, and that, more than anything else, is the part I’m proud of. You build systems properly, they keep working. The operator doesn’t always get to see the flowering of what they planted, and that’s okay. That’s the job.
For the founders and CMOs reading this
If your category already exists in the market you’re entering, a keyword plan and a media template can get you some distance. If it doesn’t, none of that will save you. What you need is someone who can build the category and sell the product at the same time, and a sponsor who understands that those two jobs take different kinds of patience.
I take on a small amount of consulting work alongside everything else, mostly because it keeps my mind sharp. So if any of this resonated, or if you just want to think out loud about a launch, a category, or a business you’re trying to build, I’m always happy to trade an hour for a good cup of coffee.